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A
Reinforcing Synchronization Securely in Online Contests with
Embedded Computing
WEI WANG, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
PENG XU, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
LAURENCE TIANRUO YANG, Huazhong University of Science and Technology
WILLY SUSILO, University of Wollongong
JINJUN CHEN, University of Technology Sydney

When competing in eBay bidding, online games or e-exams in embedded computing environments, people
naturally face asynchronous starts from different computing devices, which is treated as a security risk
of online contests. The security risks of online contest also include eavesdropping during data transmission without intended rights, and false start by malicious competitors, which also means asynchrony in
contests. Accordingly, online contests need security guarantee especially on synchronization. In this paper,
for synchronic and secure start in a contest, we update security requirements of confidentiality, anonymity
and synchrony comparing to our previous work. Based on the updated requirements, we propose a general framework of Advanced Secure Synchronized Reading (ASSR) system that can hold multiple contests
simultaneously by Cloud. Importantly, the system can ignore the impacts of heterogeneity among competitors. Considering the heterogeneity both on transmission and computing, we construct a novel Randomnessreused Identity Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (RIBKEM) to support separable decapsulation, which
can shorten both decryption delay and transmission delay with the best efforts. Finally, ASSR enhances
synchronization achievement for contests start with heterogeneous delays of competitors while satisfying
other security requirements. As a complement, the analysis on the provable security of ASSR is given, as
well as a further analysis on the achievement of synchronization.
CCS Concepts: rSecurity and privacy → Public key encryption; Access control; rComputer systems
organization → Embedded software;
General Terms: Security, System, Cryptography
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Online contest, embedded computing, synchronization, randomnessreused identity-based key encapsulation mechanism.

1. INTRODUCTION

People enjoy the conveniences brought about by embedded computing, which are generally based on smart devices connecting or operating via different wireless protocols
such as Bluetooth, NFC, WiFi, and 3G, among others, and various embedded computing cores [1]. However, differences in networking and computing result in different
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delays for smart devices when handling data online. These different delays could be
essential for some time-critical applications, for example, online contests.
For online contests, such as online e-tests, electronic competitions, and even eBay, it
is obvious that security considerations are more than the confidentiality of the data or
the anonymity of the competitors. For instance, contests needs synchronic start as the
basic fairness. In addition to real-world competitions, competitors in online contests
are sensitive to the time they start competing. Some of them even strive to start contest
tasks earlier than others or slow others down. Hence, the synchronic start of a contest
is vital to honest competitors. In contrast, dishonest competitors prefer false starts in
the other phase. Considering both phases, a secure online contest is required to start
synchronically for all competitors [2].
There are two straightforward solutions for the synchronic start of online contests.
We refer to them as the real-time and preloading modes in this paper. In the realtime mode, a contest is started by synchronically transmitting contest-relevant files
to all competitors and maintaining all files as ciphertexts. In contrast, the preloading
mode allows competitors to download encrypted files before the start and read them
at an appointed time. However, both solutions are impractical. The real-time mode is
effective under the strong assumption that all competitors experience the same delay
when processing encrypted files from the contest hosts. Otherwise, a competitor with
a higher downloading rate or decryption rate will definitely take advantage of the
others at the start of a contest. It is clear that the assumption is too strong to be
satisfied in practice because heterogeneous deployment always exists for competitors.
In contrast, the preloading mode provides enough time for competitors to download
data before a contest starts such that the difference in transmission delays is ignored.
This mode also comes with the strong assumption that all competitors are honest.
Nevertheless, malicious competitors furtively read their files before the appointed time
under this mode. Due to these facts, we require a new mode that is promising and
secure, which we call the evocation mode in this paper. In this mode, contest-relevant
data are preloaded to competitors, which will only be evoked synchronically for the
start of the contest. Considering both malicious competitors and different delays, this
mode combines several properties of the real-time and preloading modes.
The evocation mode is first applied in a Secure Synchronized Reading (SSR) system
as a heuristic solution for synchronization [3]. In the SSR system, Randomness-reused
Identity-Based Encryption (RIBE) [4] is applied to realize the evocation mode and
satisfy the security requirements, which include synchronization before competitors
decrypt their received files. We observe that in addition to transmission delay, decryption delay for different smart devices may also cause an asynchronous start for every
competitor. In this paper, our goal is to avoid the impacts of both transmission delays
and decryption delays in state-of-the-art applications. As an extension of the work of
[3], we propose an advanced SSR (ASSR) system that enhances the synchronization
performance by additionally shortening decryption delays. Our method shows promise
in terms of the design of a new encryption scheme with separable decryption. With
this encryption scheme, the expensive operations of decryption can be achieved before the appointed start of a contest, so that the decryption delay can be reduced in
state-of-the-art applications.
1.1. Contributions

Although our ASSR system also factors in several other security requirements including confidentiality and anonymity [5], the biggest challenge is realizing the evocation mode and complete synchronic start in online contests. We explored an encryption scheme, called Randomness-reused Identity-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism
(RIBKEM) with separable decapsulation, to support separable decryption of cipherACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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texts. In addition to confidentiality and anonymity, we prove that the separability of
decapsulation cannot be broken by any practical adversary. In other words, the decapsulation control is mandatory and effective. We summarize our contributions as
follows:
— We model our ASSR system so that it supports secure offline transmission for embedded computing and the evocation mode for online contests;
— We construct a RIBKEM scheme with a novel property, i.e., separable decapsulation,
and the effectiveness of this property under attacks is rigorously proved;
— We instantiate an ASSR system to satisfy security and performance requirements.
1.2. Related Works

Several previous works have focused on synchronization for online applications. However, none of them have considered the impacts of heterogeneity of the corresponding
facilities because smart devices were not popularly applied at the time these works
were published.
These previous works can be normally categorized as describing one of the two aforementioned modes. An approach used for e-exams [6; 7] is to instantly deliver the exam
files to competitors right after the start in the real-time mode. Some previous works
studied this problem and decreased the effects of delay by using a mobile agent nearby
[8] with the absence of provable security. The second mode involves preloading the files
before the claimed start for competitors such that it avoids the time sync of the files’
arrivals after the start order. The time-sync frames are applied as time controllers
to make the clocks of all the competitors uniform before the appointed time [9; 10].
In the preloading mode, competitors are assumed to be honest or supervised through
monitors, and they should evoke the start by themselves. Therefore, there is clearly no
guarantee of security. As we know, a basic rule of online contests is the confidentiality
of the files, and therefore, provable security is necessary. Otherwise, outside attacks
from eavesdroppers cannot be resisted. Moreover, asynchrony on start naturally exists even without attacks and is a characteristic of embedded computing, especially in
terms of hardware differences. Our previous work [3] proposed a SSR system that can
satisfy all the security requirements by employing RIBE. However, for synchronization, it only disregards different delays on transmission, but not on decryption.
There are other factors that could trigger asynchronous starts, which are typically
related to some classic network security problems, such as the DOS attack. These
factors have been discussed in previous works, such as those reviewed in [11], and will
be omitted in this paper. Moreover, these external factors can hardly be solved using
internal forces.
1.3. Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The ASSR system and its security
requirements are defined in Section 2. Section 3 explains why we choose public-key encryption as the basic idea for instantiating an ASSR system. We construct a RIBKEM
scheme with separable decapsulation and provable security in Section 4. In Section
5, an instantiated ASSR system is presented, and its security and performance are
analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Considering a large-scale application that supports multiple secure online contests,
our ASSR system consists of four objects (refer to Figure 1): Contest Hosts, Competitors, a Trusted Third Party (TTP), and the popular computing platform Cloud. The
SSR system adopts point-to-point transmission between any Contest Host and ComACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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petitor. Different from the original SSR system, an engaging Cloud renders Contest
Hosts occasionally online during a contest. For a general design, we make the reasonable assumptions that there are at least two Competitors in a contest and that any
Contest Host should deliver different files to different Competitors. The special case
where the same files are delivered to competitors is also supported by our general
system. The details of modeling the ASSR system are presented as follows.
2.1. Modeling the ASSR System under the Evocation mode

Contest Hosts

Online Process:
Oﬄine Process:

Private Keys
The Cloud
The TTP
Start Order

Public Keys
Competitors’ terminals

Fig. 1. The ASSR system with multiple Contest Hosts and Competitors.

The four aforementioned objects are defined as follows:
— Contest Hosts: A Contest Host is an organizer of a contest who holds all contestrelevant files. The ASSR can cover several Contest Hosts. They mainly perform two
acts sequentially: first, upload all files to the Cloud and allow competitors to download their corresponding files, and second, claim the start for all Competitors.
— Competitors: Competitors are persons who register with the system using personal
devices to attend contests. Each registered Competitor has a unique ID and coupled
keys. The Competitor has to download the corresponding file, receive the start order
and implement decryption to read the file.
— Cloud: The Cloud is the untrusted data storage platform. In other words, the Cloud
is honest in terms of doing the work it is committed to, but it is also curious about
the content of the files [12].
— TTP: The TTP is a trustable agent that randomly generates keys for encryption and
decryption. When a new Competitor or Contest Host registers in the system, the TTP
randomly generates new keys for the attender.
We generally consider the case that a Contest Host registers as a Competitor in different contest by a unique ID. Then the importance of the Cloud appears. The Contest
Host can previously upload the contest-relevant files of his contest to the Cloud, such
that he can freely attend another contest even if both contests start at the same time.
Besides, it is noticeable that in the same contest, a Contest Host can not also be a
Competitor or compromised by an adverse Competitor, since it is unfair to others if
one of the competitors is aware of the contest content at the beginning.
Our ASSR system consists of the following modules or functions:
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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— Initialization: The module runs only at the beginning to initialize our ASSR system.
In this module, the TTP generates the system parameters.
— Registration: The module requests any qualified Competitor or Contest Host to register with his own ID when logging in for the first time. Subsequently, every new attender (including Competitors and Contest Hosts) will be distributed individual keys
to decrypt their corresponding files. In other words, the TTP grants a new Competitor
or Contest Host the right to read (or to encrypt) the intended file.
— Call For Competitors (CFC): When hosting a contest, a Contest Host first runs
this module to call for possible Competitors and publish the corresponding contest
number and the CFC deadline to the Cloud. A Competitor will secretly upload his ID
to the Cloud if he wants to participate in the contest. When the time is up, the Contest
Host collects these IDs and prepares contest-relevant files for these competitors.
— Publication: After the CFC module, this module allows the Contest Host to upload
the encrypted contest-relevant files to the Cloud. Then, all Competitors will download
their corresponding ciphertexts before the claimed start of the contest. Considering
that it is inefficient for a Contest Host to stay online all the time, the Cloud is employed to support our ASSR system as eternal public storage.
— Synchronized Reading (SR): After the Publication module, this module synchronically starts the contest for all Competitors. The module cooperates with the
first and second modules to synchronize the time for the contest so that all competitors decrypt out their corresponding contest-relevant files simultaneously.
The SR module is the essential module in the ASSR system. We designate a Contest Host to authorize competitors at the intended time to read all data preloaded
synchronically as an evocation procedure in the evocation mode. Because we consider
both delays by transmission and decryption, the evocation should be processed right
after decryption or partial decryption. Therefore, in the SR module, the system must
implement two steps:
— Step 1: Competitors partially decrypt the files received using public information
and their private keys.
— Step 2: Contest Hosts evoke their registered Competitors to complete decryption
and start competing.
This system does not require authentication of the Competitors before any contest.
If a Competitor has the right to read the downloaded file from the Cloud, this indicates
that the Competitor is authenticated.
2.2. Security Requirements

In practice, our system may suffer from inside and outside attacks: from the inside, a
malicious Competitor can peek at other Competitors’ files, identify the corresponding
Competitor of a file downloaded from the Cloud, or read his file ahead of the appointed
time as a false start; from the outside, an eavesdropper can eavesdrop on Competitors’
files or identify the corresponding Competitor of the eavesdropped file. Adversaries in
the ASSR system could be malicious Competitors, malicious Contest Hosts, the honestbut-curious Cloud or eavesdroppers. They are different in terms of their authorities. A
malicious Competitor has the right to read only his own file. A malicious Contest Host
has the right to read only all the files he possesses. The honest-but-curious Cloud has
no right to read any file, but correctly delivers all the necessary files. An eavesdropper
has no right to read any file. Therefore, we say that the ASSR system is secure if it
satisfies three security requirements:
— In the CFC module, no adversary can know who joins a contest. Namely, this module
preserves the anonymity of all Competitors in a contest.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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— In the Publication module, no adversary can know who joins a contest and cannot
read a file ahead of the start time. Namely, this module preserves the anonymity and
the synchrony of all Competitors in a contest.
— In the SR module, no adversary can know who joins a contest and cannot illegally
read a file. Namely, this module preserves the anonymity and the confidentiality of
all Competitors in a contest.
3. DISCUSSIONS ON ENCRYPTION SCHEMES

Encryption in the ASSR system is used for two functions. First, it is applied to preserve the security of all privacies in a contest on the Cloud. Second, it guarantees the
synchrony of the reading process with trivial delays. Given these two functions, the
selection of encryption schemes is critical to our work. In this section, we discuss the
decisions we made for encryption schemes.
3.1. Public-Key Encryption vs. Symmetric-Key Encryption

There are two main kinds of encryption, public-key encryption and symmetric-key encryption. The symmetric-key encryption schemes usually have higher efficiency and
a lower number of system parameters than public-key encryption. Compared with
symmetric-key encryption, public-key encryption has more issues to manage than just
public-keys.
However, symmetric-key encryption uses the same keys for encryption and decryption. If symmetric-key encryption is used, we observe a dilemma between security and
efficiency for generating keys. Generating only one static key, which will be eternally
available for one Competitor, may bring a security risk to the system because the symmetric key is used multiple times and in multiple contests. Generating multiple dynamic keys for one Competitor as one-time-pad encryption will avoid the risks associated with the static key strategy. However, it is unrealistic in online contests especially
when there are multiple Competitors in multiple contests.
On the contrary, public-key encryption uses two different kinds of keys for encryption and decryption. Due to this asymmetry, no one except the intended Competitor
can break the private key without the use of brute force. Hence, the private keys can
be eternally available without the same security risks for symmetry encryption. Another advantage of public-key encryption schemes is avoiding frequent building of confidential channels between TTP and Contest Hosts. Because all public keys are public
parameters, TTP only needs to send the generated public keys and parameters to the
Contest Hosts via the Cloud. Reduced costs in terms of confidential channels provides
a huge advantage for establishing a real system.
Based on the above comparisons, public-key encryption is the better choice for our
ASSR system. Hence, TTP generates one pair of public and private keys for every
Competitor and Contest Host once they register in the system. Accordingly, ASSR can
support multiple Contest Hosts to host multiple contests in the same system without frequently exchanging keys for every Competitor. Therefore, we need public-key
encryption schemes to preserve both security and practicality.
3.2. The Speciality of Cryptography for Embedded Computing

To solve the synchronization problem, we introduced many approaches to system security and network security in related works. However, for online contests with embedded computing environments, we consider the asynchrony caused by heterogeneity
among competitors as well as false starts. In addition to the data security of contestrelevant files, we also consider the security of the control information for synchronization. Consequently, to achieve synchronization, using cryptography in the ASSR
system is the best choice.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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The application of cryptography in ASSR systems involves three procedures. First,
the data security and privacy of Competitors are guaranteed. Second, the secrecy
of contest-relevant files and the authority given to every registered Competitor before the contest starts are guaranteed. Third, the contest-relevant files are revealed to
the authorized Competitors in synchrony. With the old SSR system, the third task
involves changes in authorized Competitors receiving contest-relevant files in synchrony, which means the synchronization process only targets transmission delays.
With embedded computing, synchronization with different decryption delays is negligible, which indicates the importance of the third procedure involved in applying
cryptography.
Choosing public-key encryption schemes does not mean that only public-key encryption is applied in the system. Encrypting files involves a hybrid of public-key encryption and symmetric-key encryption, and encryption plays a more important role in
the former. To shorten the decryption delay in the system, our idea is to separate the
correlated public-key decryption into two parts at the terminal devices of the Competitors, which are respectively implemented before and after the start order. Maintaining
security in both decryption parts is challenging.
4. CONSTRUCTING RIBKEM WITH SEPARABLE DECAPSULATION

In this section, we propose a RIBKEM scheme with separable decapsulation. In concept, RIBKEM revises the traditional concept of IBKEM in the scenario of multiple receivers. Specifically, when sending an encrypted file in the identity-based setting [13]
to multiple receivers, the traditional IBKEM scheme requires the sender to choose a
new randomness for each key encapsulation. In contrast, RIBKEM allows the sender
to reuse the same randomness for all key encapsulations. Therefore, RIBKEM generates a much shorter size of ciphertext than traditional IBKEM.
In addition, the proposed RIBKEM scheme has a new property, called separable
decapsulation. With this property, the key decapsulation process can be divided into
two parts. Moreover, running the first part will not lead to a leak of the corresponding
key. This property will be used in our ASSR system to enhance synchrony.
Before proposing the RIBKEM scheme, we will review some related mathematical
concepts for preliminary knowledge. Let G and GT denote two multiplicative groups
of prime order q, and let g be a generator of G. A bilinear map ê : G × G → GT is
an efficiently computable and non-degenerate function, with the bilinearity property
ê(g a , g b ) = ê(g, g)ab , where both a and b are randomly chosen from Z∗q and ê(g, g) is a
generator of GT . Let BG(1k ) be an efficient bilinear map generator that takes as input
a security parameter 1k and randomly outputs (q, G, GT , g, ê), where k ∈ N.
The proposed RIBKEM scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encap
and Decap. In the classical application of multiple receivers, the TTP employs algorithm Setup to generate the system parameters and employs algorithm Extract to
generate private keys for all receivers. When sending receivers with different files, the
sender employs algorithm Encap to generate a randomness-reused ciphertext and several keys, where these keys will be taken as symmetric keys to encrypt the files. When
receiving a RIBKEM ciphertext and a symmetric-key ciphertext, every receiver employs algorithm Decap to decapsulate the RIBKEM ciphertext and obtain a key and
then uses the key to decrypt the symmetric-key ciphertext. Because encrypting and
decrypting symmetric-keys are independent when constructing a RIBKEM scheme,
algorithms Encap and Decap do not include encryption and decryption procedures.
The details of the proposed RIBKEM scheme are as follows:
— Algorithm Setup(1k ): Taking a security parameter 1k (where k ∈ N) as input, this
algorithm does the following steps:
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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(1) Compute (q, G, GT , g, ê) ← BG(1k );
(2) Pick a random value s ∈ Z∗q , and set P ← g s ;
(3) Choose a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G;
(4) Return a master public key MP = (q, G, GT , g, ê, P, H) and a master secret key
MS = s.
— Algorithm Extract(MS, ID): Taking MS and an identity ID as inputs, this algorithm returns ID’s private key SKID = H(ID)s ∈ G.
— Algorithm Encap(MP, I): Taking MP and an identity set I = {IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗ |i ∈
[1, N ]} as inputs, this algorithm does the following steps:
(1) Pick two random values r and t both in Z∗q ;
(2) Return a randomness-reused ciphertext (t, C) and a key set K, where C = g r and
K = {Ki = ê(P, H(IDi ))r·t |i ∈ [1, N ]};
— Algorithm Decap(MP, SKID , t, C): Taking MP, a private key SKID and a ciphertext
(t, C) as inputs, this algorithm does the following steps:
(1) Compute B = ê(C, SKID );
(2) Return the key K = B t ;
Correctness. In the proposed RIBKEM scheme, it is easy to verify the correctness of the assertion that given any ciphertext (t, C) generated by algorithm
Encap(MP, I), a private key SKID can decapsulate out a correct key using algorithm
Decap(MP, SKID , t, C) if ID ∈ I.
Separable Decapsulation. Algorithm Encap chooses a random value t ∈ Z∗q to
generate a ciphertext. This value seems to be meaningless for algorithms Encap and
Decap; nevertheless, it is very useful for constructing our ASSR system. It can be used
to achieve effective synchronization when running algorithm Decap in a scenario with
multiple receivers.
Roughly, traditional RIBKEM or IBKEM allows receivers to decapsulate out their
keys once they receive a RIBKEM or IBKEM ciphertext. Hence, a system is unable
to synchronize the time of receivers to perform their decapsulations using traditional
mechanisms. In contrast, our proposed RIBKEM scheme achieves synchronization of
multiple receiver decapsulations by controlling the publication of t because no one
can completely decapsulate a ciphertext without this value. Moreover, so that the synchronization is as efficient as possible, the value t is only used in the second step of
algorithm Decap. Hence, the proposed RIBKEM scheme avoids receivers performing
the complex bilinear map operation after receiving the value t. In other words, the
synchronization procedure can be finished in sharply compressed time. More details
on and analysis of the synchronization will be provided in the corresponding sections
of this paper.
Provable Security. We would like to prove the Anonymity and Semantic Security
(Anon-SS) of the above RIBKEM scheme under two kinds of attacks. The first attack
is the traditional one, i.e., Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA). Under this attack, a Probabilistically Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary can choose two identity sets to challenge
and query the private keys of some identities. However, he cannot query the private
keys of these challenged identities. We say that the proposed RIBKEM scheme is secure under this attack if the adversary cannot distinguish which identity set is used to
generate a challenge ciphertext-and-key pair. This security is called Anon-SS-sID-CPA
security and is defined in Appendix A.1.
The second attack is called Semi-CPA. This attack is similar to CPA, except that the
adversary is allowed to know the master secret key and only a part of the challenge
ciphertext. This means that the value t of the challenge ciphertext is unavailable to
the adversary. We say that the proposed RIBKEM scheme is secure under this attack
if the adversary cannot distinguish which identity set is used to generate the partial
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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challenge ciphertext-and-key pair. In other words, this security means that without
the value t, no one can learn anything about the encapsulated key.This indicates that
the decapsulation processes are definitely separable. This security is called Anon-SSsID-Semi-CPA security and is defined in Appendix A.2.
Formally, both the Anon-SS-sID-CPA and Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA securities of the
above RIBKEM scheme rely on the DBDH assumption, which is defined in Appendix
A.3. These two securities are guaranteed respectively by Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. Their
proofs can be found in Appendixes A.4 and A.5.
T HEOREM 4.1. Let the hash function H be modeled as a random oracle QH (·). Suppose a PPT adversary A wins the Anon-SS-sID-CPA game of the proposed RIBKEM
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
scheme with advantage AdvRIBKEM,A
. Then, there is a PPT algorithm B that solves
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
the DBDH problem in BG(1k ) with advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) = AdvRIBKEM,A
.
T HEOREM 4.2. Let the hash function H be modeled as a random oracle QH (·).
Suppose a PPT adversary A wins the Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA game of the proposed
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
RIBKEM scheme with advantage AdvRIBKEM,A
. Then, there is a PPT algorithm B that solves the DBDH problem in BG(1k ) with advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) =
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
AdvRIBKEM,A
.
Because the DBDH assumption usually holds in practice, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 imply that the proposed RIBKEM scheme preserves anonymity and semantic security
under the above two kinds of attacks.
5. AN INSTANTIATED ASSR SYSTEM BASED ON THE ABOVE RIBKEM SCHEME

In this section, we employ the proposed RIBKEM scheme to construct our ASSR system. Recall that the proposed RIBKEM scheme consists of algorithms Setup, Extract,
Encap and Decap. In ASSR, a Contest Host first encrypts all Competitors’ files using
algorithm Encap and a standard symmetric-key encryption scheme. Then, the Contest
Host distributes most of the generated ciphertexts to the Cloud, where the Competitors can download their corresponding ciphertexts at any time before the start of the
contest. The remainder of the ciphertexts is taken as the start order to synchronize
the time involved in the Competitors decrypting out their files. If this time is the time
appointed by the Contest Host to decrypt, the Contest Host broadcasts the remainder to all Competitors, whereby they can read their files by decrypting their received
ciphertexts. The details of our ASSR system are as follows:
— Initialization: The TTP chooses a security parameter k ∈ N and runs algorithm
Setup(1k ) of the above RIBKEM scheme to generate a pair of master public-andsecret keys (MP, MS), where MP = (q, G, GT , g1 , ê, P1 , H) and MS = s. Then, it
chooses a symmetric-key encryption scheme SE = (K, E, D), e.g., AES (the most popular choice in practice), where K = GT is a symmetric-key space, algorithm E(K, F )
encrypts a file F with a symmetric key K ∈ K, and algorithm D(K, C) decrypts a
ciphertext C with a symmetric key K ∈ K. Finally, it generates the public system
parameters PS = (MP, SE) and the secret system parameter SS = MS, publishes
PS and preserves the privacy of SS.
Remark 5.1. In cryptography, a chosen security parameter k ∈ N defines the least
computational complexity for breaking an instantiated cryptographic scheme. Moreover, if the quantified computation complexity is greater than 280 , it is inefficient for
breaking the instantiated cryptographic scheme, in practice. For example, RSA (a popular public key encryption scheme in practice) usually chooses the security parameter
k = 1024 such that its corresponding computational complexity is about 280 [14]. BeACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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cause the group G of the bilinear map ê is an elliptic curve group in practice, the TTP
can choose the security parameter k ∈ [160, 512] to generate the system parameters.
More details on how to choose the security parameter are provided in [15].
— Registration: When a qualified Competitor or Contest Host with identity ID
registers for the first time in the system, the TTP runs algorithm SKID =
Extract(MS, ID) and delivers the generated private key to the Competitor or Contest Host through a confidential channel.
Remark 5.2. The generated private key SKID serves as the right granted by the
TTP to the Competitor or Contest Host and allows him to read his encrypted file. Note
that the authentication of the Competitors or Contest Host is not the focus of this
paper. Therefore, we disregard this function.
— CFC: This module consists of the following works:
(1) Contest Host IDX posts a contest number T and the deadline to the Cloud to call
for Competitors for contest T . Let SKIDX be the generated private key when Contest Host IDX is registered in the system. Then, once a Competitor IDi wants
to join the contest, he runs algorithms (tX,i , CX,i , KX,i ) = Encap(MP, IDX ) and
0
0
CX,i
= E(KX,i , IDi ) and uploads (tX,i , CX,i , CX,i
) to the Cloud before the CFC
deadline of T .
(2) Suppose there are N ∈ N Competitors in the contest T . Let IT = {IDi |i ∈ [1, N ]}
denote the ID set of all the participating Competitors. When the CFC dead0
|i ∈ [1, N ]}
line arrives, Contest Host IDX logs online, downloads {tX,i , CX,i , CX,i
from the Cloud, and decrypts out all participating Competitors’ identities by sequentially running algorithms KX,i = Decap(MP, SKIDX , tX,i , CX,i ) and IDi =
0
) for i ∈ [1, N ].
D(KX,i , CX,i
(3) Each participating Competitor must remember his own tX,i and use it as the index for anonymously downloading his ciphertext from the Cloud in the following
Publication module.
Remark 5.3. In the above module, each Competitor does not submit his identity as
plaintext to the Cloud for maintaining anonymity. Specifically, each Competitor encrypts his identity using the Contest Host’s identity IDX . Hence, only Contest Host
IDX knows who joins the contest T .
— Publication: Let FX = {Fi |i ∈ [1, N ]} denote all contest-relevant files for the participating Competitors in set IT . This module consists of the following steps:
(1) Contest Host IDX runs algorithms (tX , CX , KX = {Ki |i ∈ [1, N ]}) =
0
Encap(MP, IT ) and CX
= {Ci0 |i ∈ [1, N ]}, where Ci0 = E(Ki , Fi ). Then, he keeps
the secrecy of tX and uploads (CX , {tX,i , Ci0 |i ∈ [1, N ]}) to the Cloud, where value
tX,i was provided by Competitor IDi ∈ IT in the above CFC module.
(2) Competitor IDi (i ∈ [1, N ]) downloads ciphertext (CX , Ci0 ) from the Cloud according to his value tX,i and implements the first step of algorithm Decap to obtain
Bi = ê(CX , SKIDi ).
Remark 5.4. Because it is inefficient to directly utilize a public key encryption
scheme to encrypt a file, we encrypt the file Fi by combining the proposed RIBKEM
scheme and a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Each ciphertext Ci0 is indexed by the
random value tX,i . This method allows Competitor IDi ∈ IT to anonymously download
his ciphertext. In addition, each Competitor does the first step of algorithm Decap.
This method allows the Competitors to finish the most expensive algebraic operation
(namely, the bilinear map ê) before running the following SR module. This method is
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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especially useful for synchronizing Competitors’ reading of contest-relevant files when
the files are chunked and encrypted as a pile of blocks for the convenience of operation.
— SR: This module consists of the following steps:
(1) When the time appointed by Contest Host IDX to start the contest T arrives,
Contest Host IDX broadcasts value tX , which was generated by algorithm
Encap in the Publication module, to all Competitors in set IT ;
(2) Competitor IDi (i ∈ [1, N ]) decrypts out his file Fi by sequentially running the
second step of algorithm Decap, i.e., computing Ki = BitX and decrypting out
Fi = D(Ki , Ci0 ).
Remark 5.5. To synchronize the time for the Competitors to read their files, we
allow Contest Host IDX to control the publication of tX . Moreover, when they receive
the value tX , all Competitors in set IT can decrypt out their files. The correctness of
decryption is guaranteed by the proposed RIBKEM scheme and the symmetric-key
encryption scheme SE.
Figure 2 illustrates the procedures of our ASSR system with Competitor IDi and
Contest Host IDX for contest T .
Data Owner IDX

Competitor IDi

TTP
(MP, MS) = Setup(1k )
choose SE = (K, E, D)

Initialization
PS = (MP, SE)

SKIDi = Extract(MS, IDi )
PS, SKIDi

Registration

Call For
Competitors

T and deadline

′
tX,i , CX,i,0 , CX,i,1 , CX,i

{tX,i , CX,i,0 , CX,i,1 ,
′
CX,i
|i ∈ [1, N ]}

Publication

Synchronized
Reading

′
(tX,i , CX,i,0 , CX,i,1 , CX,i
)

for i ∈ [1, N ]

(tX , CX ) = Enc(MP, IX , MX )
{Ci′ = E(Ki , Fi )|i ∈ [1, N ]}
{C0 , tX,i , Ci , Ci′ |i ∈ [1, N ]}

C0 , tX,i , Ci , Ci′
for i ∈ [1, N ]
tX

tX,i
(C0 , Ci , Ci′ )
Bi = ê(C0 , SKIDi )
Ki = Ci · BitX

Fi = D(Ki , Ci′ )

Fig. 2. Operating procedures of our ASSR system with Competitor IDi and Contest Host IDX for contest
T.

6. SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF ASSR

In this section, we prove that the above ASSR system is secure and promising under
the requirements defined in Section 2.
6.1. Analysis of Security

We prove that our instantiated ASSR system satisfies the security requirements defined in Subsection 2.2. Supposing that the symmetric-key encryption scheme SE utilized by our ASSR system is secure; then, for any symmetric-key ciphertext Ci0 =
E(Ki , Fi ) (i ∈ [1, N ]), no one can read the corresponding file Fi of Ci0 if he does not
know the symmetric key Ki . The security proof consists of the following claims.
C LAIM 1. The CFC module preserves the anonymity of all participating Competitors.
P ROOF. In the CFC module, each Competitor IDi ∈ IT secretly submits his identity to Contest Host IDX by independently encrypting IDi by (tX,i , CX,i , KX,i ) =
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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0
Encap(MP, IDX ) and CX,i
= E(KX,i , IDi ). According to the Anon-SS-ID-CPA security of the proposed RIBKEM scheme in Theorem 4.1, other than the TTP, only Contest Host IDX can decapsulate out KX,i and further decrypt out IDi . It is easy to prove
that other than the TTP, only Contest Host IDX knows the identities in set IT , which
implies that the CFC module preserves the anonymity of all participating Competitors.

C LAIM 2. The Publication module preserves the anonymity and synchrony of all
participating Competitors.
P ROOF. In the Publication module, given identity set IT and file set FX , Contest Host IDX sends ciphertext (CX , {tX,i , Ci0 |i ∈ [1, N ]}) to the Cloud, and then,
CompetitorIDi takes value tX,i as an index to retrieve ciphertext (CX , Ci0 ) from the
Cloud, where value tX,i was randomly chosen in the CFC module. According to the
Anon-SS-ID-Semi-CPA security of the proposed RIBKEM scheme, no one (including
the TTP) can decapsulate out symmetric key Ki and file Fi from CX and Ci0 , respectively, or determine whether Competitor IDi joins the contest T according to (CX , Ci0 ).
In addition, value tX,i is independent of file Fi and identity IDi . In summary, the Publication module preserves the anonymity and synchrony of all participating Competitors.
C LAIM 3. The SR module preserves the anonymity and confidentiality of all participating Competitors.
P ROOF. In the SR module, Contest Host IDX broadcasts value tX to all participating Competitors. For each Competitor IDi ∈ IT , the Anon-SS-ID-CPA security of the
proposed RIBKEM scheme guarantees that (1) in addition to theTTP and Contest Host
IDX , only Competitor IDi can decrypt out symmetric key Ki and file Fi from (tX , CX )
and Ci0 , respectively, and (2) except for the TTP, Contest Host IDX and Competitor IDi ,
no one knows that Competitor IDi joins the contest T . This implies that the SR module
preserves the anonymity and confidentiality of all participating Competitors.
6.2. System Performance
Table I. Symbols for analyzing the performance of ASSR.
Symbol
BM
ME
MI
k
|IDi |
|Fi |
N
IDi
IDX

Notion
the algebraic operation of the bilinear map
the algebraic operation of modular exponentiation
the algebraic operation of modular inversion
the security parameter
the binary length of a Competitor’s identity
the binary length of the file for Competitor IDi
the number of all participating Competitors
a Competitor
a Contest Host

In this subsection, we analyze the performance of ASSR by evaluating the number
of expensive algebraic operations and communication costs in the three main modules
of ASSR: the CFC, Publication and SR modules. The most expensive algebraic operations are the bilinear map, modular exponentiation and modular inversion. We list
the related symbols in Table I. In this analysis, we disregard the cost of symmetric-key
encryption, as this cost is mainly decided by the size of the encrypted file, which will
be illustrated in the next subsection.
From Tables III, IV and V, Competitor IDi is efficient in processing the algebraic
operations in the three main modules of ASSR. In the CFC module, Competitor IDi
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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Table II. Simulation Configuration
TERRAINa
Node Number
Node Placement
Application
Payload Size
Routing Layer
MAC Layer
Radio Layer
Radio Bandwidth
Radio Range

(200m×200m) Square
289
Uniform
Many-to-Many/Gossip CBR Streams
32 bytes
GF
CSMA/MMSN
RADIO-ACCNOISE
250Kbps
20m–45m

Table III. Performance of the CFC module.
IDi
IDX

BM
1
N

ME
2
N

MI
0
0

Communication Cost (Unit: Bit)
3 · kP
+ |IDi |
3 · N · k + i∈[1,N ] |IDi |

Table IV. Performance of the Publication module.
IDi
IDX

BM
1
N

IDi
IDX

BM
0
0

ME
0
N+1

MI
0
0

Communication Cost (Unit: Bit)
3 · k +P|Fi |
(2 + N ) · k + i∈[1,N ] |Fi |

Table V. Performance of the SR module.
ME
1
0

MI
0
0

Communication Cost (Unit: Bit)
k
k

only uses one more modular exponentiation than the most efficient IBE scheme (called
BF01 in this paper) in the previous work [16]. Both in the Publication and SR modules, the performance of Competitor IDi is more efficient than the BF01 scheme, and in
the CFC and Publication modules, the encryption cost of Contest Host IDX is linear
with the number of the participating Competitors in his holding contest. In practice, it
is reasonable to assume that Contest Host IDX is capable of processing these algebraic
operations for providing a contest service.
With respect to communication costs, Competitor IDi requires little cost for both
the CFC and SR modules because in practice, we usually have k ∈ [160, 512]. In the
Publication module, the main communication cost of Competitor IDi is linear with
the size of the file Fi . It is also reasonable to assume that this communication cost
is acceptable. Contest Host IDX acquires the highest cost on communication in the
CFC and Publication modules. Moreover, the communication cost is linear with the
number of the participating Competitors in Contest Host IDX ’s contest if we suppose
that all files are of the same size. Hence, it is also reasonable to assume that Contest
Host IDX has the capability to receive and deliver the related data for providing a
contest service.
6.3. Synchronization Achievement

Referring to our model, the strict synchronization is not achievable as long as the
provable security of contests. The security requirements should be satisfied by keeping secrets, which indicates it is necessary to release the secrets at the start of the
contests with delay. Thus, we observe the synchronization achievement of the system
by separately measuring the delay of communication and decryption after the start order. As mentioned, our main contributions are to build the ASSR system and decrease
the size of the secrets with the best effort. According to our numerical results, we claim
the delay of the contests are uniformly existed for all Competitors and negligibly tiny.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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Table VI. Comparisons of the bit lengths of the broadcasted secret tX with the practical PDU of the heterogeneous networks.
Network
Bits
R+CRC
192 ∼ 544
802.11 MAC frame ¬
40 ∼7991
802.16 RLC PDU 
656
TCP/IP packet ®
1k ∼ 12000
¬ the basic data unit of MAC layer in WLANs [17].
 the basic protocol data unit in WiMAXs [18].
® the basic data packet in TCP/IP protocols [19].

As the basic function, our ASSR system is expected to be promising in terms of
evoking a synchronized start for time-critical contests. In a contest T , we denote the
time appointed by Contest Host IDX to start the contest as S. In the ASSR system,
0
Contest Host IDX generates ciphertext (tX , CX , CX
= {Ci0 |i ∈ [1, N ]}). Before the time
0
S, Contest Host IDX sends ciphertext (CX , Ci ) to Competitor IDi (where i ∈ [1, N ]) via
the Cloud.
In ASSR, the different delays related to transmission and decryption for heterogeneous Competitors have negligible impacts on synchronization, which is achieved using two of our contributions. First, we avoid most of the obvious differences in file deliveries for heterogeneous Competitors in the system because all big-sized data transmissions are completed offline. Second, we shorten the decryption delays after the start order arrival by supporting separable decapsulation with the proposed RIBKEM scheme.
We show our analysis of synchronization performance in two phases.
The synchronization achieved with ASSR produces negligible differences between
the transmission delays of tX for Competitors and as few differences as possible in the
time costs of Competitors for decrypting their files when receiving tX . For guaranteeing
synchronization, ASSR performs five processes: the first three are completed to avoid
obvious differences between file transmissions, and the rest shorten decryption delays.
The five processes are as follows:
0
) are distributed by the Cloud without
(1) The encrypted files for a contest (CX , CX
considering delays in the Publication module.
(2) The deliveries of tX to Competitors synchronically start for the sake of the broadcasting character.
(3) The delay in delivering tX with short bit lengths within the range [160, 512] is negligible in practice.
(4) Claim 2 in Subsection 6.1 guarantees that all Competitors cannot decrypt out their
files before receiving tX . In other words, all Competitors cannot read their files
before the time S.
(5) The most expensive algebraic operations, i.e., bilinear maps in RIBKEM, are completed in advance before the SR module.

In addition to the above five processes, all Competitors are assumed to receive their
ciphertexts from the Cloud before time S because the Cloud supports the stored ciphertext delivery at any time. According to the capability of the Cloud, the preloading
of ciphertexts by heterogeneous Competitors will be distributed without delays. Moreover, Claim 2 proves that before time S, no Competitor can decrypt out the original
files.
When time S arrives, Contest Host IDX broadcasts the value tX to all Competitors even if they have heterogeneous encrypted files. Due to the security requirements,
secret broadcasting delay is inevitable. Since that, in our first contribution, the transmission delay after time S is only caused by delivering tX as the official start. From
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Table VII. Configuration of the system parameters.
PC1 Hardware
PC2 Hardware
OS and Compiler
Program Library

Intel Pentium M CPU @1.73GHZ
Intel Core 2 Duo CPU E5300 @ 2.60GHz
Windows XP and Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
MIRACL version 5.4.1
Parameters of bilinear map
Elliptic Curve
y 2 = x3 + A · x + B · x
Pentanomial Basis
tm + ta + tb + tc + 1
Base Field: 2m
m = 379
A
1
B
1
Group Order: q
2m + 2(m+1)/2 + 1 or 2m − 2(m+1)/2 + 1
a
315
b
301
c
287
The default unit is decimal.

Remark 5.1, the binary length of the value tX belongs to the range [160, 512] in practice and is independent of the number of Competitors and the size of the Competitors’
files. Assuming that Contest Host IDX communicates with the Competitors via heterogeneous networks, we acknowledge that the delays reported in Table VI are trivial.
Although the heterogeneity of the network bandwidths causes diverse delays during
Competitors completely receiving tX , we can omit the delays in data delivery in practice because the delays are very short compared with various delays caused by single
Protocol Data Unit (PDU) in different protocols as shown in Table VI. Here, we provide an illustrative example to explain the synchronization performance with the first
phase guarantee. There is only a 2 ∼ 8 ms gap between the start via a 56 kb/s dial-up
network and 100 M/s ethernet.
Without our secure synchronized reading system, it is observable that the maximum
transmitting delay gap from one Competitor to others is the cumulative communication cost to sequentially deliver different files to other competitors by wireless. With
our secure synchronized reading system, it is decreased to the maximum difference in
broadcasting short-length bits of tX . Therefore, ASSR manages marvelous advantage
of synchronization on communication delay as our first contribution.
In our second contribution, which is the essential one of ASSR compared to our
previous work SSR, Competitors already begin the decapsulation proceedings of their
ciphertexts locally in the Publication module in the first step. During the decapsulation, as illustrated in last subsection in Tables IV and V, the most expensive time cost
is due to the Publication module for each Competitor. Thus, the cost of the remainder of the decapsulation process in the SR module is comparably small. According
to Claim 2, only after the start order arrives can Competitors start to complete the
decapsulation. This indicates that the decryption delays in ASSR are caused by the
leftover RIBKEM decapsulation in the SR module and symmetric-key decryption. To
show the impacts of such a separated decapsulation approach, we performed decryption experiments on two different PCs with the environment and system parameters
shown in Table VII. The experiments were conducted using a group of files of different
sizes. We compared the CPU computational costs of the decryption in the SR module using different files and different computing devices with the original SSR system
and the ASSR system. The results are listed in Table VIII, which clearly shows that
the computational cost associated with ASSR is lower. Table VIII also shows that the
computational cost linearly increases with the size of the encrypted file because the
computational cost of symmetric-key decryption linearly increases with the size of the
encrypted file. However, the computational cost of RIBKEM decapsulation remains the
same irrespective of the size of the file. Because the cost of decapsulation shows no reACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
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Table VIII. Experiments on decryption delay.
Size of the File
(Unit: Byte)
1K
256K
512K
1M
2M
3M

Time Cost (Unit: CPU cycle and ms)
The Original Scheme in [3]
The New Scheme W
P C1
P C2
∆d
P C1
P C2
20081510 (11.813ms)
17912414 (6.889ms)
4.924ms
4019780 (2.364ms)
4360330 (1.677ms)
39898517 (23.470ms)
33436741 (12.860ms)
10.610ms
20098071 (12.293ms)
20067840 (7.718ms)
53732660 (31.607ms)
48411883 (18.620ms)
12.987ms
37502536 (22.061ms)
35050028 (13.487ms)
96461623 (56.743ms)
78824408 (30.317ms)
26.426ms
80336714 (47.257ms)
65384982 (25.148ms)
177544062 (104.437ms) 142554893 (54.829ms) 49.608ms
161359247 (94.971ms)
129162358 (49.678ms)
236820110 (139.306ms) 202484009 (77.878ms) 61.428ms 220386030 (129.639ms) 188729814 (72.588ms)

lationship with the size of the original file, only the computational cost of RIBKEM
decapsulation is reduced using ASSR.
As illustrated in Table VIII, when the file is small in size (less than 1 M) or the
computational capacities of the two Competitors are extremely different, the advantage of ASSR is obvious. The ASSR system is applicable in the Internet of Things (IoT)
because there are big gaps in computation between embedded cores even though the
decryption delay in a contest is far shorter than the transmission delay. The synchronization performance of ASSR with a decryption delay is trivial compared to that with
a transmission delay for a single online contest. However, when a competitor registers in multiple contests that start at the same time, the CPU of the competitor must
decrypt the files in a sequence. Thus, the decryption delay for the Competitor accumulates when the files are decrypted one by one. Such cases always occur on eBay or
other online bidding applications when delivering multiple files for multiple auctions.
In these cases, the synchronization performance of ASSR will be significantly higher
than the original SSR system because ASSR further reduces the decryption delay.
7. CONCLUSION

According to our construction and analysis, the Advanced Synchronized Reading System can be conveniently applied to online contests with provable security and enhanced synchronization performance. Our goal in this paper is to preserve the synchrony and security in online contests. Synchrony can be achieved by engineering
without considering security. However, it is a paradox to consider both security and
synchrony by naive approaches. We resort to cryptographic methods and produce a
novel formula for the synchronization problem in a cryptographic framework. Our revised RIBKEM reduces decryption delays by its novel property of supporting separable
decapsulation. Moreover, the remainder of the decapsulations of different Competitors
are controllable in terms of the Contest Hosts achieving synchrony. Finally, we prove
that security requirements are guaranteed by the security proofs of the ASSR, and
we analyze the synchronization performance, which is enhanced compared to previous
works. In conclusion, ASSR is a promising and efficient system that satisfies security
requirements for online contests.
APPENDIX
A.1. Defining Anon-SS-sID-CPA Security

Definition A.1 (Anon-SS-sID-CPA security). The proposed RIBKEM scheme is
Anon-SS-sID-CPA secure if any PPT adversary A has only a negligible advantage
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
AdvRIBKEM,A
to win in the following Anon-SS-sID-CPA game:
— Setup Phase: Adversary A sends two challenge identity sets (I0∗ , I1∗ ) to a challenger, where |I0∗ | = |I1∗ | = N . The challenger sets up the RIBKEM scheme
by running algorithm Setup to generate a pair of master public-and-secret keys
(MP, MS), and sends MP to A.
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— Query Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively issues the following query multiple times,
except
— Decryption Key Query QSK (ID): Taking as input an identity ID, the challenger
outputs a private key of identity ID;
— Challenge Phase: The challenger computes (t∗0 , C0∗ , K0∗ ) = Encap(MP, I0∗ ) and
(t∗1 , C1∗ , K1∗ ) = Encap(MP, I1∗ ), and sends the challenge ciphertext-and-key pair
(t∗0 , C0∗ , Kd∗ ) to A, where d ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen.
— Query Phase 2: This phase is the same with Query Phase 1. Note that both in
Query Phase 1 and Query Phase 2, adversary A can not query the private keys
of the challenge identities.
— Guess Phase: Adversary A sends a guess d0 to the challenger. We say that A wins
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
if d0 = d. And let AdvRIBKEM,A
= P r[d0 = d] − 21 be the advantage of A to win in
the above game.
A.2. Defining Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA Security

Definition A.2 (Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA security). The proposed RIBKEM scheme
is Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA secure if any PPT adversary A has only a negligible adAnon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
vantage AdvRIBKEM,A
to win in the following Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA game:
— Setup Phase: Adversary A sends two challenge identity sets (I0∗ , I1∗ ) to a challenger, where |I0∗ | = |I1∗ | = N . The challenger sets up the RIBKEM scheme
by running algorithm Setup to generate a pair of master public-and-secret keys
(MP, MS), and sends (MP, MS) to A.
— Challenge Phase: The challenger computes (t∗0 , C0∗ , K0∗ ) = Encap(MP, I0∗ ) and
(t∗1 , C1∗ , K1∗ ) = Encap(MP, I1∗ ), and sends the partial challenge ciphertext-and-key
pair (C0∗ , Kd∗ ) to A, where d ∈ {0, 1} is randomly chosen.
— Guess Phase: Adversary A sends a guess d0 to the challenger. We say that A wins
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
if d0 = d. And let AdvRIBKEM,A
= P r[d0 = d] − 12 be the advantage of A to win
in the above game.
A.3. Defining The DBDH Assumption

Definition A.3 (The DBDH Assumption). The DBDH problem in BG(1k ) =
(q, G, GT , g, ê) is defined as the advantage of any PPT algorithm B to distinguish the
tuples (g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g)abc ) and (g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g)y ), where (a, b, c, y) are randomly chosen
in Z∗4
q . Let
AdvBDBDH (1k ) =Pr[B(g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g)abc ) = 1] − Pr[B(g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g)y ) = 1]

be the advantage of algorithm B to solve the DBDH problem. We say that the DBDH
assumption holds in BG(1k ), if advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) is negligible in parameter k.
A.4. Proving Theorem 4.1

P ROOF. To prove Theorem 4.1, we will construct the PPT algorithm B that plays
the Anon-SS-ID-CPA game with adversary A and utilizes the capability of A to solve
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
the DBDH problem in BG(1k ) with advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) = AdvRIBKEM,A
. The
constructed algorithm B is as follows.

— Setup Phase: Adversary A sends two challenge identity sets (I0∗ , I1∗ ) to algorithm
B, where |I0∗ | = |I1∗ | = N . Algorithm B takes as input (q, G, GT , g, ê, g a , g b , g c , Z)
(where Z equals either ê(g, g)abc or ê(g, g)y ), and does following steps:
(1) Initialize a list H = ∅ ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × G × Z∗q ;
(2) Generate a master public key MP = (q, G, GT , g, ê, P = g a );
(3) Send MP to adversary A;
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— Query Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively issues the following queries multiple
times.
— Hash Query QH (ID): Taking as input an identity ID, algorithm B does following
steps:
∗
(1) Pick a random
q;
S ∗ value x ← Zc·x
∗
(2) If ID ∈ I0 I1 , add (ID, g , x) into H and output g c·x ;
(3) Otherwise, add (ID, g x , x) into H and output g x ;
— Decryption Key Query QSK (ID): Taking as input an identity ID, algorithm B
does following steps:
(1) If (ID, ∗, ∗)S∈
/ H, query QH (ID);
(2) If ID ∈ I0∗ I1∗ , abort and output ⊥;
(3) Retrieve (ID, X, x) from H according to ID, and output g a·x ;
— Challenge Phase: Algorithm B randomly picks d ← {0, 1}, and does following steps:
(1) For identity IDi ∈ Id∗ (where i ∈ [1, N ]), if (ID, ∗, ∗) ∈
/ H, query QH (IDi );
(2) Randomly choose t∗0 ∈ Z∗q and generate C0∗ = g b ;
(3) For identity IDi ∈ Id∗ (where i ∈ [1, N ]), retrieve (IDi , Xi , xi ) from H according
∗
to IDi , generate Ki = Z xi ·td ;
(4) Send the challenge ciphertext-and-key pair (t∗0 , C0∗ , Kd∗ = {Ki |i ∈ [1, N ]}) to A;
— Query Phase 2: This phase is same with Query Phase 1.
— Guess Phase: Adversary A sends a guess d0 to algorithm B. If d = d0 , B output 1;
Otherwise, output 0.
Next, we will compute the advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ). According to the above game, it
is easy to find that when Z = ê(g, g)abc , algorithm B simulates a real Anon-SS-sID-CPA
game in the view of adversary A. So we have
1
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)abc ] = (AdvRIBKEM,A
+ ).
2
When Z = ê(g, g)y , the generated challenge ciphertext-and-key pair in Challenge
Phase is independent with all challenge identities. So we have
1
P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)y ] =
2
Now, we can compute advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) as follows:
AdvBDBDH (1k )

= P r[B = 1|Z = ê(g, g)abc ] − P r[B = 1|Z = ê(g, g)y ]

= P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)abc ] − P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)y ]

Anon-SS-sID-CPA
= AdvRIBKEM,A

In addition, it is clear that algorithm B is a PPT algorithm, if adversary A is a PPT
adversary. Conclusively, if a PPT adversary A wins in the Anon-SS-sID-CPA game of
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
the proposed RIBKEM scheme with advantage AdvRIBKEM,A
, then there is a PPT
k
algorithm B that solves the DBDH problem in BG(1 ) with advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) =
Anon-SS-sID-CPA
AdvRIBKEM,A
.
A.5. Proving Theorem 4.2

P ROOF. To prove this theorem, we will construct a PPT algorithm B that plays
the Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA game with adversary A and utilizes the capability
of A to solve the DBDH problem in BG(1k ) with advantage AdvBDBDH (1k ) =
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
AdvRIBE,A
. The constructed algorithm B is as follows.
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— Setup Phase: Adversary A sends two challenge identity sets (I0∗ , I1∗ ) to algorithm B,
where |I0∗ | = |I1∗ | = N . Algorithm B takes as input (q, G, GT , g, ê, g a , g b , g c , Z) (where
Z equals either ê(g, g)abc or ê(g, g)y ), and does following steps:
(1) Initialize a list H = ∅ ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × G × Z∗q ;
(2) Pick a random value s ← Z∗q and set P = g s ;
(3) Set a master public key MP = (q, G, GT , g, ê, P ) and a master secret key MS = s;
(4) Send (MP, MS) to adversary A;
— Query Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively issues the following query multiple times.
— Hash Query QH (ID): Taking as input an identity ID, algorithm B does following
steps:
(1) Randomly Pick x ← Z∗q ;
(2) Add (ID, g a·x , x) into H and output g a·x ;
— Challenge Phase: Algorithm B randomly picks d ← {0, 1}, and does following steps:
(1) For identity IDi ∈ Id∗ (where i ∈ [1, N ]), if (IDi , ∗, ∗) ∈
/ H, query QH (IDi );
(2) For identity IDi ∈ Id∗ (where i ∈ [1, N ]), retrieve (IDi , g a·xi , xi ) from H according
to IDi , generate Ki = Z s·xi ;
(3) Set C0∗ = g b , and send the partial challenge ciphertext-and-key pair (C0∗ , Kd∗ =
{Ki |i ∈ [0, N ]}) to A;
— Query Phase 2: This phase is same with Query Phase 1.
— Guess Phase: Adversary A sends a guess d0 to algorithm B. If d = d0 , B output 1;
Otherwise, output 0.
According to above game, it is easy to find that when Z = ê(g, g)abc , algorithm B simulates a real Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA game in the view of adversary A, and it implies
that t∗0 = c. So we have
1
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)abc ] = (AdvRIBKEM,A
+ ).
2
When Z = ê(g, g)y , the partial challenge ciphertext is independent of all challenge
identities. So we have
1
P r[d = d0 |Z = ê(g, g)y ] = .
2
Therefore, we have
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
AdvBDBDH (1k ) = AdvRIBE,A
.

In addition, it is clear that algorithm B is a PPT algorithm, if adversary A is a PPT
adversary. Conclusively, if a PPT adversary A wins in the Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
game of the proposed RIBKEM scheme with advantage AdvRIBKEM,A
, then
k
there is a PPT algorithm B that solves the DBDH problem in BG(1 ) with advantage
Anon-SS-sID-Semi-CPA
AdvBDBDH (1k ) = AdvRIBE,A
.
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